USDCの‌価格

Hello, ive been using the convert feature a lot the last few days and ive noticed that even when they say theres no fees, most of the trades i make whem i convert one crypto into another that the over overall value of the new crypto i get has drooped by a decent amount lately, even on trades where the value of it isnt undergoing any change. For instance i converted the crypto Kll into XcX the value of eacch of them did not change at all during the conversion of $KII 920 and it changed into $XCX 860 a loss of $60US. this was just theblatest one but i estimate ive lost over $1000US. there are some conversion where they come out with the sqme value they went in as and i know some of my trades happed under volatile market conditions where the value went down before i manged to sell it but still to kany happened like the one ibdescribed and others where ibwas even converting into USDC and other stable coins. so if anyone can help id really appreciate it. Thanks

Two collateral books, two repayment obligations The September 24 proposal would initially fund lending by pledging DAO-owned WETH and WBTC, with $AAVE permitted up to 50% of collateral at each pledge. WETH and WBTC represent wrapped Ether and Bitcoin. The DAO would borrow $USDC or $USDT on Aave V3 and use that financing for institutional facilities. Separately, the institutional borrower would place $BTC or $ETH with a qualified custodian. That collateral would secure the borrower’s loan under a Master Loan Agreement with an Aave Labs entity. A three-party Account Control Agreement would connect the lender, borrower and custodian. These are different assets pledged for different debts. The DAO’s onchain pledge would be separate from the borrower’s custody account. The proposal says borrower collateral would never be rehypothecated, or pledged onward. That structure allows an institution to obtain liquidity while retaining its crypto exposure, subject to margin terms. It also leaves the DAO with an onchain debt that has to remain adequately collateralized independently of the institution’s repayment schedule. The proposed custodian would monitor borrower collateral, issue margin calls and liquidate if those calls were unmet. Legal security interests and title transfer on default are intended to let the lender direct a sale and repayment. The documents describe how enforcement would work; a record of enforcement under these facilities remains to be reported. Typical initial loan-to-value ratios would be 60% to 75%, according to Aave Labs. A loan-to-value ratio compares the amount borrowed with the collateral’s value. Each facility’s margin trigger, cure period and liquidation terms would determine how far collateral could fall before enforcement. A broad crypto decline could weaken both books. Falling $BTC or $ETH would increase pressure on an institution’s custodied collateral, while declines in the DAO’s WBTC, WETH or $AAVE could reduce the cushion supporting its stablecoin borrowing. The proposal explicitly recognizes the risk of $AAVE weakening when $BTC-backed loans come under stress. Its 50% cap limits $AAVE’s share when collateral is pledged. Management of subsequent changes in that share would sit with the Aave Finance Committee, led by TokenLogic, which would also monitor funding-position health. Onchain funding also has its own collateral requirements. Aave’s borrowing documentation explains that a borrower must maintain sufficient collateral and monitor its health factor, a measure of the position’s protection against liquidation. More collateral or partial repayment can be needed as that protection deteriorates. For the proposed institutional business, this creates a liquidity question before it necessarily creates a credit loss. An institution might still be paying its loan while the DAO needs to strengthen the collateral securing its funding. Borrower collateral cannot be assumed immediately available to support the separate DAO position; access would depend on the facility’s security and enforcement arrangements. Whether such pressure would actually arise depends on the initial DAO collateral mix, debt size, health factors and facility margin terms. Those details have not been published in the proposal and clarification. The structure supports a correlated-stress scenario, with the size and timing of any collateral sales dependent on those undisclosed positions and terms. $GRVT

Ostium published a two-stage recovery plan on Wednesday for the 3,666 wallets that lost money when an attacker drained its liquidity vault on July 15, and opened a portal for holders to claim. The plan resolves almost every affected wallet by count and a small share of the money. Stage 1 repays 3,321 wallets, 90.6% of those affected, in full on Wednesday through what Ostium calls a Convenience Recovery Contract. Those wallets lost $1,000 or less each, which caps the tranche at $3.32 million against the $23.8 million taken. The other 345 wallets, each of which lost more than $1,000, elect either a $1,000 payment or a pro-rata share of Stage 2. Ostium will fund Stage 2 from money recovered from the attacker, a share of protocol revenue, and what it describes as potential further benefits. The company says full Stage 2 detail will be released progressively before the election deadline, and has not set out the revenue-share percentage, the deadline date, or what the further benefits are. Ostium has recovered 649,967 $USDC from the attacker so far, 2.7% of the loss. The vault held 32.7 million $USDC immediately before the first attack transaction and 8.96 million $USDC after the last one, Arbitrum data from the Ostium Liquidity Pool (OLP) contract shows. That leaves 27.4% of the vault. Ostium puts the figure at about 30% of pre-incident holdings. Funding Stage Two Recovered attacker funds depend on tracing that Ostium said in its post-mortem it will not report on publicly: “We are not publishing live tracing balances or detailed attribution because doing so could compromise the investigation or recovery effort.” The $USDC was converted to ETH and moved across wallets, protocols and chains, with a substantial portion sent through Tornado Cash. Ostium generated $87,800 in fees over the past 30 days, of which $33,600 was protocol revenue, DefiLlama data shows. Perpetual futures volume over the same period was $169 million, and open interest was $10.4 million. Sixty-Nine Percent Down Liquidity providers who never withdrew carry the loss in the share price. OLP was worth 1.10 $USDC before the attack and is worth 0.337 today, a 69.3% decline, according to the vault contract’s own accounting. Supply has fallen from 29.8 million OLP to 19.3 million as providers redeemed. Value locked across the protocol stands at $8.8 million, down from $63.8 million the day before the attack. Senior Tranche, Junior Buffer Ostium’s documentation describes OLP as the senior loss position in a two-tranche vault, protected by a buffer of capital posted by Ostium affiliates and strategic partners. “OLP capital is the last pool of money to take a loss in the system,” it reads. “The only way OLP takes a loss is if the entire buffer is wiped out first.” The attack did not run through that waterfall. The attacker submitted unauthorized BTC-USD price reports of $5,000 and $60,000, opened and closed positions against them inside the same transaction, and collected the difference as trader profit, which the OLP vault pays out directly. Ostium restructured the vault when it launched an institutional hedging layer on April 28, routing net directional trader flow to Jump and prime brokers off-chain. $GRVT

$GRVT Whale Alert has confirmed a substantial transfer of 107,085,329 USDC (approximately 107,096,145 USD) from an unknown wallet to the USDC Treasury. This significant transaction highlights ongoing market dynamics and raises questions about liquidity and stability within the ecosystem. You can view the full details on their official tweet. Breaking It Down The recent transfer reported by Whale Alert is noteworthy in the context of current market fluctuations. As of now, the broader cryptocurrency market is exhibiting mixed signals, with varying momentum across major assets. Transfers of this magnitude are often scrutinized for their potential impact on market sentiment and liquidity, especially in relation to USDC’s stability and usage within decentralized finance (DeFi). Key Takeaways Whale Alert confirms a transfer of 107,085,329 USDC. The transfer originated from an unknown wallet. Funds were sent to the USDC Treasury. The transaction occurred on September 30, 2026. Market watchers are closely monitoring USDC’s performance. What the Data Shows Currently, the cryptocurrency market is seeing diverse activity, particularly around stablecoins like USDC. The significance of this transfer lies not only in its size but also in its implications for market liquidity. With the broader market experiencing mixed signals, large transactions like this can influence trader sentiment and investment strategies, especially as they pertain to USDC’s role in market stabilization. Whale Alert is a prominent service that tracks large cryptocurrency transactions, providing insights into market movements. USDC is a stablecoin widely used for trading and transactions within the crypto space, and the USDC Treasury plays a critical role in maintaining its peg and liquidity. The transfer’s monitoring is crucial for understanding potential impacts on market health and trader behavior. Eyes on These Levels Traders should keep an eye on USDC’s performance in the coming days as this transfer could signal shifts in liquidity and market confidence. Observing how USDC holds its peg will be vital, particularly if further large transactions occur. The implications of this transfer may unfold as market participants analyze its effects on broader trends, especially in the decentralized finance sector. The post Whale Alert Confirms 107M USDC Transfer to USDC Treasury appeared first on Coinfomania.